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OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This is a dispute over reinsurance coverage. In 1998,
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. (“Travelers”) reached a $137
million settlement with its insured, Acme Corporation
(“Acme”).1 Travelers then proceeded to allocate those $137
million dollars among three tiers of insurance coverage, only the
highest of which—the so-called “excess” layer—included
policies reinsured by Ace America Reinsurance Company and
Insurance Company of North America (collectively, “INA”).
When Travelers billed INA $13,762,395 based on its allocation,
INA refused to pay, and Travelers sued to recover in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

1

The actual name of the insured is subject to a confidentiality
agreement with Travelers. Out of respect for that agreement, we
refer to it here by a pseudonym, Acme Corporation, which we
note stands for “A Company that Makes Everything.” See
W i k i p e d i a ,
A c m e
C o r p o r a t i o n ,
http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki/Acme_Corporation (last visited
June 7, 2010).
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At issue before the District Court was whether Travelers
manipulated its post-settlement allocation so as to maximize the
amount allocated to policies reinsured by INA, thus excusing
INA from its normal duty as a reinsurer to “follow” all coverage
decisions made by its reinsured. The District Court held two
bench trials, each addressing a different aspect of Travelers’
allocation, and ultimately reached what was, in effect, a split
decision. The Court ruled, following the first bench trial, that
Travelers had not manipulated its allocation of the settlement
dollars so as to allow it to reach the excess layer of coverage
(and thus tap into its reinsurance). But the Court also ruled after
the second bench trial that, once Travelers reached the highest
tier of coverage, it allocated more to certain policies reinsured
by INA than was reasonably allowed by their policy limits. The
result of those two verdicts was to leave INA responsible for
only $8,226,817 of the loss initially allocated to it.
The Court then issued two consequential post-trial
rulings. In the first, it held that prejudgment interest on
Travelers’ award should be calculated according to the
Pennsylvania rate, even though the reinsurance contracts under
which Travelers sued were governed by New York law. In the
second, it held that post-judgment interest on the prejudgment
interest did not begin to accrue until the District Court issued its
order quantifying the amount of prejudgment interest due.

4

Both parties appealed.2 We affirm both trial verdicts as
well as the ruling concerning when post-judgment interest on the
prejudgment interest began to accrue. However, because we
believe that Travelers’ award of prejudgment interest should be
calculated according to the higher New York rate, we remand on
that issue only so that the prejudgment interest can be
recalculated.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Follow-the-Fortunes
Reinsurance Relationship

Doctrine

and

the

Because the events that gave rise to this dispute occurred
in the context of a relationship between an insurer (Travelers)
and its reinsurer (INA), we begin with some background into the
reinsurance relationship. Reinsurance is a mechanism “‘by
which one insurer insures the risk of another insurer.’” N. River
Ins. Co. v. ACE Am. Reins. Co., 361 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting People ex rel. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Miller, 70 N.E.
10, 12 (N.Y. 1904)). The insurer pays the reinsurer a premium
in exchange for which the reinsurer assumes “a portion of the
[insurer’s] potential financial exposure under certain direct

2

After the notices of appeal were filed in this case, Travelers
settled with Ace America Reinsurance Company, leaving
Insurance Company of North America as the sole
appellee/cross-appellant.
5

insurance policies it has issued to its insured.” Id. Obtaining
reinsurance allows an insurer to diversify its risk exposure, thus
increasing its “capacity to insure other customers and
decreas[ing] the likelihood that . . . insolvency will result from
any large claim.” N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52
F.3d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995).
A crucial feature of the reinsurance relationship is that
“[r]einsurance involves contracts of indemnity, not liability.”
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d
Cir. 1993). That is, in providing reinsurance, the reinsurer
acquires no direct liability to the original policyholder; rather,
the reinsurer assumes an obligation to indemnify the insurer for
payments it makes under the reinsured policies. Id. Indeed, a
reinsurance agreement typically contains two specific provisions
designed to prevent the reinsurance relationship from
encroaching on coverage disputes between the insurer and its
insured: a “follow-the-form” provision, in which the reinsurer
agrees to reinsure the policies as written, and a “follow-thefortunes” provision, in which the reinsurer agrees to “follow”
the coverage provided by the insurer. See CIGNA, 52 F.3d at
1199–1200.
Of these two provisions, the most crucial is the followthe-fortunes provision. See Barry R. Ostrager & Mary Kay
Vyskocil, Modern Reinsurance Law & Practice § 2.03[d] (2d
ed. 2000), at 2-17 (noting that the “follow-the-fortunes”
provision lies “at the heart of the reinsurance agreement”). The
6

follow-the-fortunes doctrine significantly restricts a reinsurer’s
ability to challenge the coverage decisions that led to its liability
to the insurer. This is so for a basic reason—“[i]f the [insurer]
knew that its settlement decisions could be challenged by every
reinsurer, there would be little incentive to settle with the
insured. The costs and risks of litigation avoided by settling
with the insured would only be revived at the reinsurance stage.”
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 66 (D. Mass. 1998); see also CIGNA, 52 F.3d at
1206 (“To permit the reinsurer to revisit coverage issues
resolved between the insurer and its insured would place
insurers in the untenable position of advancing defenses in
coverage contests that would be used against them by reinsurers
seeking to deny coverage.”).
Accordingly, the follow-the-fortunes doctrine “insulates
a reinsured’s liability determinations from challenge by a
reinsurer unless they are . . . in bad faith, or the payments are
clearly beyond the scope of the original policy.” 3 ACE, 361 F.3d
at 140 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other
words, a reinsurer seeking to avoid payment must show either
that the coverage decisions that led to the reinsurer’s liability to

3

There is a third ground on which a reinsurer can deny
payment for a covered loss—when such a loss was “expressly
excluded by terms of” the reinsurance contract. CIGNA, 52 F.3d
at 1200. That particular exception to the follow-the-fortunes
doctrine is not at issue here.
7

the insurer were made in bad faith, or that the coverage provided
clearly fell outside the scope of the policies the reinsurer agreed
to reinsure. See Mentor Ins. Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Brannkasse, 996
F.2d 506, 517 (2d Cir. 1993). Otherwise, the reinsurer must
simply cover the losses allocated to it.
B.

Acme v. Travelers and Travelers v. INA

In April 1996, Travelers acquired Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company (“Aetna CS”). At the time, Acme was seeking
coverage under insurance policies issued by Aetna CS in the
1970s and 1980s. Acme sought coverage primarily for two sets
of claims being brought against it: (1) breast implant claims,
relating to safety testing of silicone breast implants that Acme
had performed for its parent, Acme Parent Corporation 4 (“Acme
Parent”); and (2) chemical products claims, relating to chemical
products manufactured by Acme, including the pesticide
commonly known as “DBCP.” 5 The Aetna CS policies
potentially implicated by the breast implant claims and the
chemical products claims made up three distinct layers of
coverage—primary policies (bearing the designator “AL”),

4

As is obvious, this too is a pseudonym.
5

In addition, Acme was seeking coverage under policies
Travelers had issued to Acme prior to Travelers’ acquisition of
Aetna CS for numerous claims relating to environmental
damage.
8

buffer policies (bearing the designator “XS”), and excess
policies (bearing the designator “XN”).6 Because the distinct
features of each layer’s policies became central to the dispute
between Travelers and INA that followed, it is worth describing
those policies in some detail.
1.

The Insurance Policies

The AL policies were issued between April 1976 and
April 1987 and provided coverage for all non-products claims
brought against Acme, as well as products claims brought
against it outside the United States. Each of the AL policies had
a per-occurrence coverage limit, but only the policies issued
between April 1985 and April 1987 had aggregate coverage
limits.
In addition, the AL policies had three features that
became particularly significant to the reinsurance dispute that
followed. First, the policies were subject to retrospective
premiums from Acme. For any payment Travelers made on an
AL policy, it was entitled to reimbursement from Acme up to
that particular policy’s “loss limit.” 7 The AL policies covering

6

Aetna CS was not Acme’s sole insurer, as it purchased
coverage from multiple providers.
7

The relevant loss limits were: $250,000 for the policies
covering the period from April 1978 through to April 1985;
9

the period from April 1976 through April 1982 included a limit
on the amount in retrospective premiums that could be collected,
while the post-April 1982 AL policies included no such limit.
Second, the AL policies were subject to captive reinsurance, that
is, reinsurance provided by an Acme subsidiary. Each AL
policy was reinsured for 95% of all losses above the loss limit,
except the last policy, which was reinsured at 95.5% above the
loss limit.8 Finally, the AL policies included an obligation to
cover defense expenses in addition to an obligation to indemnify
Acme for liability it incurred. For the April 1976 through April
1982 AL policies only, defense costs did not count toward the

$500,000 for the policies covering the period from April 1985
through to April 1986; and $1 million for the policies covering
the period from April 1986 through to April 1987.
8

As will be discussed in greater detail below, the combined
effect of the retrospective premiums and the captive reinsurance
was that, under many coverage scenarios, Acme, not Travelers,
would be responsible for the vast bulk of the loss covered by the
AL policies. As experts for both parties explained at trial,
during the years in which this coverage was purchased,
companies like Acme were typically unable to find outside
insurers willing to offer primary coverage. Thus, they would
often (as Acme did with respect to its products coverage)
provide their own primary coverage through a subsidiary, or (as
Acme did with respect to the AL policies) obtain outside
coverage specifically by agreeing to reassume the bulk of the
risk from the insurer.
10

policy limits, while, for all the AL policies, captive reinsurance
could not be sought for defense costs unless Travelers also made
indemnity payments to Acme.
The XS policies covered the period between April 1976
and April 1982. They provided United States products liability
coverage and were in excess of Acme’s primary layer of
products liability coverage, meaning that they were only
available to Acme once its primary layer of products liability
coverage (which was supplied by a Acme subsidiary) was
exhausted.9 The XS policies were also subject to captive
reinsurance. The policies spanning from April 1976 to April
1978 were 100% reinsured for bodily injury claims, while the
remaining XS policies were 95% reinsured for all claims.
The XN policies provided the final layer of coverage.
These policies covered both products and non-products claims,
and were in excess of all Acme’s insurance coverage (including
its coverage under the AL and the XS policies).10 While none
of the XN policies was subject to either retrospective premiums
or captive reinsurance, the XN layer was the one layer that did

9

The attachment points for the XS policies—that is, the point
at which their coverage kicked in—were $2.4 million or $4
million, depending on the specific policy.
10

The XN policies attached at between $9 million and $200
million.
11

possess non-captive reinsurance, including reinsurance from
INA.11
INA assumed, through facultative reinsurance
certificates, 12 a portion of nine of the XN policies. Each
certificate issued by INA contained both a follow-the-form
provision and a follow-the-fortunes provision.
2.

The Settlement Negotiations

Acme initially sought coverage for the tens of thousands
of breast implant claims brought against it under the AL
policies, and sought coverage for the chemical products claims
under both the XS policies and the XN policies.13 At first,

11

For ease of reference, the term “reinsurance” will
hereinafter be used to refer exclusively to the type of reinsurance
provided by INA, that is, non-captive reinsurance. The term
“captive reinsurance” will be used to refer to the type of
reinsurance provided by Acme’s subsidiaries.
12

“Facultative reinsurance” refers to reinsurance on specific
insurance policies, rather than reinsurance on all the coverage
provided to a particular insured, which is generally referred to
as “treaty reinsurance.” See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am., 419 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2005).
13

Acme also sought coverage for the chemical products
claims from Travelers (not Aetna CS) under products liability
policies that had been issued by Travelers in the 1950s.
12

Aetna CS declined coverage, and then, starting in February
1996, made a series of settlement offers to Acme, each of which
was rejected. Upon its acquisition of Aetna CS, Travelers
restarted settlement negotiations from scratch. Negotiations
were handled, from Travelers’ end, by Timothy Yessman, who
was Senior Vice President of Travelers’ Special Liability Group,
and Susan Stonehill-Clafin, who was General Counsel for
Travelers’ Environmental Litigation Group. Yessman acted as
lead negotiator, while Stonehill-Clafin provided legal advice.
Up to that point, Acme had not yet settled, or received an
adverse judgment on, any of the claims against it, but had
incurred substantial defense costs. Accordingly, the parties
focused initially on reaching a “coverage-in-place” deal. Under
such an arrangement, Travelers would agree to pay a fixed sum
to cover Acme’s past losses, and, for Acme’s future losses, the
parties would work out a formula for matching the specific
claims against Acme to the specific insurance policies.
Travelers would then make payments pursuant to that
formula—subject to a finite cap—as Acme’s ultimate liability
developed.
In its negotiations with Acme about how to characterize
the claims for which coverage was being sought, Travelers was

Travelers refers to these policies as the “TIC” policies because
they were written by Travelers Indemnity Co. We continue that
usage.
13

adamant about two points—that the breast implant claims were
products claims, and thus were not covered by the AL policies,14
and that they arose out of a single occurrence (namely, a single
act of negligent testing on Acme’s part). According to
testimony Yessman later provided, it was the number of
occurrences issue that was viewed as the most critical. Because
the AL policies possessed per-occurrence limits, but were not
(for the most part) subject to aggregate limits, Travelers’
greatest concern was that the breast implant claims would be
characterized as non-products claims arising out of multiple
occurrences. Under such a scenario, it was possible that
Travelers’ exposure under the AL policies would be
exponentially greater, at least if the liability for each occurrence
was below the per-occurrence limit.15

14

One of the reasons why Travelers wanted the breast
implant claims characterized as products claims was that fewer
dollars were available under the XN policies for products claims
than for non-products claims. That is because, prior to
Travelers’ acquisition of Aetna CS, it and Acme Parent had
reached a settlement relating to a different set of breast implant
claims and characterized them as products claims. The result of
that settlement was that a significant portion of the XN policy
limits for products claims had already been exhausted.
15

In addition, because the pre-April 1982 AL policies
included a limit on the amount of retrospective premiums that
could be collected, Travelers would have been limited in its
ability to shift its loss back to Acme under such a scenario.
14

While the negotiations with Acme were ongoing,
Yessman had Mark Wigmore, a Vice-President and Associate
General Counsel in Travelers’ reinsurance department, produce
a memo (the “Wigmore Memo”) that became central to the
litigation that followed.16 The Wigmore Memo explored the
reinsurance implications of different coverage scenarios for the
breast implant claims. The Memo noted a number of issues of
potential concern, only two of which are particularly germane to
this appeal. First, the Memo suggested that, because Travelers
could not collect captive reinsurance on payments made to cover
defense costs unless it also paid out in indemnity, it was possible
that “Acme [would] litigate each and every case to the fullest
extent, without making any settlements, in order to avoid
its . . . reinsurance obligations.” (J.A. at 615.) Second, the
Memo mentioned that, if the breast implant claims were
determined to be non-products claims arising out of multiple
occurrences, Acme might never get out of the AL layer of
coverage and into the reinsured XN layer, since, if the liability
for each occurrence was low enough, it was possible that it
would never exhaust the per-occurrence limits of the AL
policies not subject to aggregate limits. The Memo also

16

The exact date of the Wigmore Memo is unclear, as the
copy in the record is undated and neither Yessman nor Wigmore
testified as to its precise date. What is undisputed is that it was
produced at some time between when Travelers acquired Aetna
CS in April 1996 and when Travelers and Acme reached a
tentative settlement in July 1998.
15

speculated that, if Travelers were to bill its reinsurers based on
a single occurrence characterization, “[c]ollection [from them
would] likely . . . be more difficult,” but that, if Acme agreed to
that characterization in any settlement, Travelers “would have
a strong position” in “litigation or arbitration” with its
reinsurers. (J.A. at 616.)
The final settlement meeting between Travelers and
Acme took place on July 7, 1998, at which point both parties
changed their approach. Acme proposed moving to an all-cash
net settlement. That meant that, rather than (as with a coveragein-place deal) coming up with a formula for how to treat Acme’s
future losses, Travelers would simply pay Acme a lump
sum—forgoing both retrospective premiums and captive
reinsurance—in exchange for Acme releasing all of its future
claims under the policies.17 Travelers accepted the proposal and,
with the new framework in place, the parties quickly agreed on
a figure of $137 million. They then decided that, of that $137
million, $80 million would be dedicated to the breast implant
claims, $20 million would be dedicated to the chemical products
claims, and the remaining $37 million would go to claims that
are not at issue in this case. In addition, the parties agreed that
the breast implant claims would be treated as non-products,
single occurrence claims, while the chemical products claims
would be treated as products claims. Beyond that, they did not
17

The idea of doing a “net” settlement was not new, as Acme
had insisted on a net arrangement from the onset of negotiations.
16

come to any agreement about how to allocate the settlement to
the specific policies potentially implicated.
3.

The Final Settlement Agreement

Although Travelers and Acme reached an agreement in
principle during the July 7, 1998 meeting, the settlement was not
finalized until September of that year. The primary issue in
dispute was Travelers’ proposed allocation of the agreed-upon
sum among the different policies. According to Robert Miley,
who, along with William Kingston, was primarily responsible
for drafting the settlement agreement on behalf of Travelers,18
it was not that Acme objected to Travelers’ proposed allocation
so much as that it “wondered whether . . . it [i.e., the allocation
language] needed to be . . . in the settlement agreement.” (Trial
Tr. vol. 1, 216, Jan. 11, 2005.)
In a draft dated July 27, Travelers included language
indicating that, of the $20 million dedicated to the chemical
products claims, $5 million would be allocated to the TIC
policies, while the remaining $15 million would be allocated to
the XN policies. That draft also included language providing
that no amount could be allocated to the post-April 1982 AL
policies. In a draft returned to Travelers on September 1, Acme
crossed out most of the allocation language, put a question mark

18

Stonehill-Clafin worked on the settlement as well, but left
for maternity leave shortly after the drafting process began.
17

next to the line indicating that the post-April 1982 AL policies
were not to be used, and added language stating that, with the
exception of any allocations specifically set forth in the
agreement, each party reserved the right to allocate the
settlement as it pleased. In a draft returned on September 4,
Acme continued to designate the allocation language “IN
DISPUTE,” and specifically crossed out the section regarding
allocation to the post-April 1982 AL policies.
The settlement agreement became final in midSeptember. It provided that Travelers’ payments to Acme were
“net of any reinsurance obligations the Acme Insurance
Subsidiaries have or may have to Travelers and net of any
retrospective premium or other obligations Acme has or may
have to Travelers.” It also included the language indicating that
the $20 million for the chemical products claims would be
divided between the TIC policies ($5 million) and the XN
policies ($15 million). In addition, the final version included a
paragraph providing that “[n]o payments . . . shall be allocated
to any [AL] Primary Policies with a policy period commencing
on or after April 1, 1982, or to any . . . XS Policies because the
payments of the Settlement Amount are net payments and such
Policies have been exhausted by virtue of the settlement.”
Lastly, the final version provided that “[w]ith the exception of
the agreements explicitly set forth in . . . this Agreement, Acme
and Travelers each reserve to themselves the right to allocate
any or all of the Settlement Amount to any Policy; Acme will
not be deemed to concur in any such allocation by Travelers,
18

and Travelers will not be deemed to concur in any such
allocation by Acme.” In the subsequent litigation with INA,
Travelers conceded that the allocation language was included in
the settlement agreement at its behest.
4.

The Post-Settlem ent
Reinsurance Billing

Allocation

and

Once the settlement agreement was finalized, Miley and
Kingston proceeded to allocate the settlement among the
different policies. As agreed, of the $20 million dedicated to the
chemical products claims, $5 million was allocated to the TIC
policies and $15 million to the XN policies. Travelers
characterized the $80 million dedicated to the breast implant
claims entirely as indemnity, not defense coverage. In allocating
that $80 million, Travelers began with the AL layer of policies,
but, in accord with the agreement, confined itself to the preApril 1982 AL policies. In allocating within that layer, it
employed the so-called “fill the bathtub” method.19 Starting
with the earliest of the policies, Travelers allocated to each
eligible AL policy up to its single-occurrence limit (minus the

19

Under the “fill the bathtub,” or “rising bathtub,” method of
allocation, “losses are allocated to the lowest layer of coverage
first and, like a bathtub, fill[ed] from the bottom layer up.
Under th[is] approach, a given layer of coverage is not
implicated until the layer beneath it is completely exhausted.”
ACE, 361 F.3d at 138 n.6.
19

amount owed in retrospective premiums) before moving on to
the next policy.20 This resulted in a total of $24 million being
allocated to the AL policies. The remaining $56 million of the
$80 million dedicated to the breast implant claims was then
allocated to the XN policies in accordance with the fill-thebathtub method (starting with the XN policies with the lowest
attachment points). Two of the XN policies implicated by
Travelers’ allocation of the breast implant claims settlement had
three-year policy periods. In exhausting those three-year
policies (each of which was reinsured by INA), Travelers treated
their per-occurrence limits as applying separately to each policy
year, a decision that tripled the amount that could be allocated
to those policies.
Ultimately, six of the nine XN policies reinsured by INA
had settlement dollars allocated to them. Pursuant to its
allocation, Travelers billed INA $11,604,328 for the breast
implant claims and $2,158,067 for the chemical products claims.
Travelers agrees that the following decisions likely increased the
amount of its coverage it was able to allocate to INA—(1)
treating the breast implant claims as arising out of a single
occurrence; (2) bypassing the post-April 1982 AL policies in
allocating the $80 million dedicated to the breast implant claims;
(3) bypassing the XS policies in allocating the $20 million

20

Thus, for a policy with a $2.5 million per-occurrence limit
and a $150,000 loss limit, Travelers allocated $2,350,000 of the
$80 million to it before moving on to the next policy.
20

dedicated to the chemical products claims; (4) not allocating the
$80 million for the breast implant claims exclusively to defense
costs (even though, at the time of the settlement, Acme had not
yet incurred any liability on those claims); and (5) allocating to
the three-year XN policies on the assumption that their peroccurrence limits applied separately to each policy year.21 The
decision to annualize the per-occurrence limits alone resulted in
an increase of $5,535,578 to the amount of loss assigned to INA.
At any rate, INA refused to pay any of the amount Travelers
allocated to it.
C.

The District Court Proceedings

In January 2001, Travelers brought its breach of contract
action against INA, contending that INA was barred, under the
follow-the-fortunes doctrine, from challenging Traveler’s
resolution of its coverage dispute with Acme. In insisting that
it was not obligated to pay, INA did not question the propriety
of the underlying $137 million settlement. Rather, it challenged
only Travelers’ post-settlement allocation of that settlement.
At the close of discovery, both parties moved for
summary judgment. In August 2004, the District Court denied

21

Travelers does not, however, concede that any of these
decisions was made for the express purpose of increasing its
reinsurance recovery. It merely admits that they may have had
that effect.
21

both parties’ motions for summary judgment and the case
proceeded to two separate bench trials. The first trial (“Phase
I”) addressed whether Travelers had engineered its postsettlement allocation to maximize the amount of the settlement
that ended up in the reinsured XN layer of coverage. The
second trial (“Phase II”) addressed the propriety of Travelers’
decision, once it reached the XN layer, to treat the three-year
policies as subject to three separate per-occurrence limits.
Prior to the Phase I bench trial, INA made a motion in
limine seeking to preclude testimony relating to discussions
with, or analyses prepared by, Travelers’ in-house 22 or outside
counsel. In its motion, INA asserted that, under the so-called
“sword/shield” doctrine, Travelers could not both invoke a
privilege to shield its communications with its attorneys (as it
had throughout discovery) and defend its conduct with reference
to advice received by counsel. The District Court partially
denied and partially granted the motion, limiting Travelers’
testimony on its advice from counsel to the topic, rather than the
content, of those communications. Ultimately, the Court ruled
that Travelers could refer generally to its use of counsel in

22

Of the individuals who worked on the different stages of
the settlement with Acme, only Yessman was not in-house
counsel. (Yessman has a law degree, but Travelers’ position
was that he acted as a “businessman,” not a lawyer, during the
process.) The category of in-house counsel therefore included
Stonehill-Clafin, Miley and Kingston.
22

making certain decisions to show that it proceeded in a
“businesslike” manner, but could not attribute any particular
decision to the advice of counsel. (J.A. at 30.)
The Phase I trial was held in January and February of
2005. The District Court heard testimony from both parties’
experts, as well as the Travelers employees who worked on the
settlement with Acme (including the post-settlement allocation
and the reinsurance billing),23 all of whom denied that
reinsurance recovery considerations motivated any of their
decisions. In December 2005, the District Court ruled in favor
of Travelers on the issues addressed in the Phase I trial. The
Court summed up its findings as follows:
Although there is certainly enough
evidence in the record to raise the
suspicions of [INA], I generally
find Travelers’ witnesses to be
credible.
I further find that
Travelers did not allocate the sum
plaintiff owed under the settlement
agreement to maximize its potential
reinsurance recovery from [INA],
that Travelers did not act in bad
faith, and that its various actions
were reasonable, businesslike
23

Neither party called anyone from Acme to testify.
23

decisions made in good faith.
(J.A. at 57.)
The Phase II trial was held in February 2006. After once
again hearing testimony from both parties’ experts, as well as
from Travelers’ employees, the District Court ruled in INA’s
favor. The Court concluded that, under Michigan law (which
governed the insurance policies Aetna CS had issued to Acme),
“the three-year XN policies clearly and unambiguously have a
single per-occurrence limit for the entire policy period.” (J.A.
at 96.) It therefore held that Travelers’ interpretation of the
those policies’ per-occurrence limits was not binding on INA as
its reinsurer. The Court then (in an order summing up both its
Phase I and its Phase II rulings) entered judgment in favor of
Travelers in the amount of $8,226,817, a figure derived by
subtracting from Travelers’ initial billing of $13,762,395 the
$5,535,578 attributable to its decision to annualize the peroccurrence limits of the three-year XN policies.
Next, the District Court issued two consequential posttrial orders. First, it held that, though the reinsurance contracts
between Travelers and INA were governed by New York law,
it was required, as a federal court sitting in diversity in
Pennsylvania, to calculate the prejudgment interest owed on
Travelers’ award under the (lower) Pennsylvania rate, as
(according to the District Court) such a calculation falls under
Pennsylvania’s procedural, rather than its substantive, law.
24

Second, the Court held that post-judgment interest on Travelers’
award of prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue until the
Court issued its order quantifying the amount of prejudgment
interest owed to Travelers, rather than (as Travelers contended)
beginning to run when the Court first awarded Travelers a sum
subject to prejudgment interest.
Both parties timely appealed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
In considering the appeals from the District Court’s
Phase I and Phase 2 bench trials, “we review [the] [D]istrict
[C]ourt’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of
law de novo.” McCutcheon v. Am.’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d
143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). When “confronted with mixed
questions of fact and law, we apply the clearly erroneous
standard except that the District Court’s choice and
interpretation of legal precepts remain subject to plenary
review.” Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d
Cir. 2005). To the extent that the District Court’s conclusions
rested on credibility determinations, our review is particularly
deferential. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575
(1985) (“When findings are based on determinations regarding
the credibility of witnesses, . . . even greater deference to the
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trial court’s findings [is required]; for only the trial judge can be
aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear
so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what
is said.”). Nonetheless, a “trial judge may [not] insulate his [or
her] findings from review by denominating them credibility
determinations, for factors other than demeanor and inflection
go into the decision whether or not to believe a witness.” Id.
Finally, insofar as what is being challenged is an evidentiary
ruling, not a specific finding of fact or conclusion of law, we
review “for abuse of discretion.” Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).
Our review of the District Court’s determination that
Pennsylvania law applies to the calculation of Travelers’ award
of prejudgment interest is de novo. See Hammersmith v. TIG
Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a
“District Court’s choice of law determination” is subject to
plenary review). The same is true of our review of the District
Court’s ruling with respect to when post-judgment interest on
Travelers’ prejudgment interest began to run, as post-judgment
interest is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) and “a question of
statutory interpretation . . . requires de novo review.” Pell v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 539 F.3d 292, 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
III. CHOICE OF LAW
The parties agree that New York law governs the
reinsurance certificates INA issued to Aetna CS (and which
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Travelers is seeking to enforce). They further agree that
Michigan law governs the policies under which coverage was
provided to Acme. Whether Pennsylvania or New York law
applies to the calculation of prejudgment interest is in dispute
and will be addressed below.
IV. DISCUSSION
INA is challenging the District Court’s Phase I ruling.
Travelers challenges the Court’s Phase II ruling, along with its
determinations that Pennsylvania law applies to the calculation
of prejudgment interest and that post-judgment interest on the
prejudgment interest did not begin to run until the Court’s order
quantifying the amount in prejudgment interest owed to
Travelers. We discuss each of these challenges in turn.
A.

The Phase I Ruling

The Phase I trial concerned the bad faith exception to the
reinsurer’s duty to go along with the coverage provided by the
insurer. More specifically, the Phase I trial addressed INA’s
allegation that Travelers manipulated its post-settlement
allocation to allow it to reach the reinsured XN layer of
coverage. The District Court ultimately rejected this challenge,
holding that INA had failed to show bad faith on Travelers’ part.
We affirm.

27

1.

The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith in the PostSettlement Allocation Context

The primary purpose of the follow-the-fortunes doctrine
is to prevent the reinsurance relationship from interfering with
coverage disputes between the insurer and its insured. See
CIGNA, 52 F.3d at 1199 (explaining that the doctrine “prevents
reinsurers from second guessing good-faith settlements and
obtaining de novo review of judgments of the [insurer’s]
liability to its insured”). As such, there is some dispute over
whether that doctrine should apply to post-settlement
allocations, especially where, as here, the allocation decisions
being challenged were not the product of active bargaining
between the insurer and the insured.24 See Employers Reins.
Corp. v. Newcap Ins. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191 (D. Kan.
2002) (declining to apply the doctrine to an allocation decision
that the insurer and insured left unresolved); Graydon S. Staring,
Law of Reinsurance § 18.10 (4th ed. 2007), at 18-56 (suggesting
that the doctrine should only apply to a particular allocation

24

It is true that the final settlement agreement did dictate
certain allocation decisions. But it is clear from the record of
the negotiations over the final text of that agreement that the
allocation language was inserted at Travelers’ insistence, a point
it has conceded during this litigation. The focus of active
bargaining between the parties was the final dollar figure, not
the details of the coverage Travelers would ultimately provide
to Acme.
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decision “if [it] was necessarily and genuinely part of the claims
settlement process”).
Nonetheless, the majority view, which INA does not
contest, is that the doctrine does apply to post-settlement
allocations. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gerling
Global Reins. Corp. of Am., 419 F.3d 181, 188–89 (2d Cir.
2005); ACE, 361 F.3d at 140–41; Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Am. Re-Ins. Co., 441 F Supp. 2d 646, 652–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Commercial Union, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68.
We join those courts here. A contrary holding would risk doing
precisely what the follow-the-fortunes doctrine aims to
prevent—interfering in settlement negotiations between insurers
and their insureds by discouraging a particular type of settlement
(here, an all-cash deal).
However, “applying the follow-the-[fortunes] doctrine to
post-settlement allocation decisions does not leave a reinsurer
without protection.” ACE, 361 F.3d at 141. Those allocations
must still have been in “good faith” to be binding on the
reinsurer. Id. We have broadly characterized the insurer’s duty
of good faith to its reinsurer as a duty not to take advantage of
the reinsurer’s dependence on the decisions made by the insurer.
See CIGNA, 52 F.3d at 1216 (“[T]he duty of good faith requires
the reinsured to align its interests with those of the reinsurer.”).
In the post-settlement allocation context, this means that an
insurer breaches this duty when it makes allocation decisions
primarily for the purpose of increasing its reinsurance recovery.
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See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 837 N.Y.S.2d
138, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“A reinsurer is not bound by
the follow-the-fortunes doctrine where the reinsured’s
settlement allocation . . . reflects an effort to maximize
unreasonably the amount of collectible reinsurance.”); see also
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 251, 259 (D. Conn. 2000) (denying summary judgment
to an insurer “in light of the inferences of unreasonableness or
self-service that can be drawn” from the details of its postsettlement allocation).
We make clear, however, that the insurer’s negative duty
not to make allocation decisions primarily in order to increase
reinsurance recovery does not translate into a positive duty on
the part of the insurer to minimize its reinsurance recovery. See
Gerling, 419 F.3d at 193 (“[An insurer] choosing among several
reasonable allocation possibilities is surely not required to
choose the allocation that minimizes its reinsurance recovery to
avoid a finding of bad faith.” (emphasis in original)). What this
means for the reinsurer’s burden of persuasion is that, to
establish a breach of the duty of good faith, it is not sufficient
simply to demonstrate that a particular allocation decision
increased the insurer’s access to reinsurance, at least not where
the insurer is able to point to some legitimate (i.e., nonreinsurance-related) reason for the challenged decision. See id.
(“An allocation that increases reinsurance recovery—when
made in the aftermath of a legitimate settlement and when
chosen from multiple possible allocations—would rarely
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demonstrate bad faith in and of itself.”). To prevail, the
reinsurer must either provide direct evidence that the insurer was
motivated primarily by reinsurance considerations, or show that
the after-the-fact rationales offered by the insurer are not
credible. INA attempted to do both in this case.
2.

INA’s Challenges

INA challenges the District Court’s Phase I ruling
essentially on three grounds. First, it asserts that three of the
specific allocation decisions Travelers made—to bypass the
post-April 1982 AL policies in allocating the breast implant
claims settlement, to allocate the chemical products claims
settlement without performing any independent analysis of how
those claims matched up to its policies or without allocating any
of the settlement amount to the XS policies, and to allocate the
entire portion of the settlement dedicated to the breast implant
claims as indemnity—are inexplicable except as part of a
scheme to maximize Travelers’ reinsurance recovery. Second,
INA argues that the Wigmore Memo is direct evidence that
Travelers improperly considered reinsurance implications in
performing the allocation. And, finally, INA claims that the
District Court’s ruling was based on evidence that should have
been excluded—namely, evidence that Travelers sought and
received legal advice about how to handle its insurance coverage
dispute with Acme.
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i.

The Bypassing of the Post-April 1982
AL Policies in Allocating the Breast
Implant Claims Settlement

In allocating the $80 million of the settlement dedicated
to the breast implant claims, Travelers allocated $24 million to
the pre-April 1982 AL policies and nothing to the post-April
1982 AL policies. The District Court held that this decision was
not evidence of bad-faith maximization because it followed
from the “net” nature of the settlement Travelers reached with
Acme.25 (J.A. at 50.) While we disagree with some of the
details of the District Court’s analysis, we end up at the same
place—i.e., concluding that bypassing the post-April 1982 AL
policies was reasonable in light of the net nature of the
settlement.
The District Court’s specific reasoning was that, because
25

The District Court also noted that the final settlement
agreement dictated that the post-April 1982 AL policies be
bypassed. We are uncomfortable attributing much significance
to that under the facts of this case. As noted above, the
exchanges between Acme and Travelers over the text of the
final agreement strongly suggest that this language was inserted
into the agreement entirely at Travelers’ behest and was not the
product of any give-and-take between the parties. We are
reluctant to adopt a rule whereby an insurer could insulate its
allocation from challenge by its reinsurer simply by getting its,
essentially indifferent, insured to agree to it.
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the post-April 1982 AL policies were subject to both
retrospective premiums and captive reinsurance, “there was no
real risk transfer” under those policies, and thus “any allocation
to [them] would have contravened the ‘net’ deal with Acme.”
(J.A. at 50.) Strictly speaking, however, it is not true that the net
nature of the settlement prevented Travelers from allocating to
these policies. As INA notes, the only thing Travelers was
required to do on account of the net settlement was not bill
Acme for either retrospective premiums or captive reinsurance.
Indeed, the pre-April 1982 AL policies were also subject to
retrospective premiums and captive reinsurance. Yet that did
not prevent Travelers from doing, with respect to those policies,
what INA contends it was required to do with respect to the
post-April 1982 AL policies—allocate to them up to their peroccurrence limits (minus the amount Acme would have owed it
in retrospective premiums), and then simply not ask for any
captive reinsurance back.
The District Court concluded that Travelers was justified
in treating the pre- and-post April 1982 AL policies differently
for allocation purposes because the latter, but not the former,
had unlimited retrospective premiums available to them. But, as
both Miley (who was largely responsible for the post-settlement
allocation) and Travelers’ expert, Robert Hall, conceded at trial,
this difference would not have come into play under a singleoccurrence allocation. That is because, under a singleoccurrence allocation, the per-occurrence limits would have
been exhausted long before the retrospective premiums available
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under the pre-April 1982 AL policies were exhausted. Indeed,
the position advanced at trial by Miley and Hall was that
Travelers should have bypassed all the AL policies, not (as the
District Court held) that Travelers was correct to bypass some,
but not all, of those policies.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with INA that, because
Travelers was not required to bypass the post-April 1982 AL
policies, it was a breach of good faith for it to do so. Because
Travelers was under no duty to minimize its reinsurance
recovery, the mere fact that it could have, consistent with its
agreement with Acme, allocated to all the AL policies does not
mean that it was required to do so. The question we think more
apt is whether the net nature of the settlement made bypassing
the AL policies a reasonable option (even if it was one that, for
reasons that are unclear, Travelers only took halfway). See
Gerling, 419 F.3d at 193 (explaining that the follow-the-fortunes
doctrine only requires that an allocation be “reasonable,” not
that it be the one allocation “among several reasonable
allocation possibilities” that minimizes the burden on the
reinsurer).
The position advanced by Travelers’ experts at trial was
that, because the AL policies did not provide for any significant
risk transfer (at least not on a single-occurrence, indemnity-only,
allocation), those policies were essentially exhausted by
stipulation once the parties agreed to a net deal, thus authorizing
Travelers to move on to the next layer of coverage. INA’s
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experts took the opposite position—namely, that the net deal
simply waived Travelers’ right to collect captive reinsurance,
but did not alter the basic fact that an insurance policy is only
exhausted when money is allocated to it up to the applicable
coverage limit.
Fortunately for us, we need not wade into this quasimetaphysical debate over what exhausting an insurance policy
“really” requires. In this context, it is enough to note that INA
has not shown that Travelers’ position is unreasonable. The
theory put forward by Travelers—that the net nature of the deal
authorized it to allocate the settlement as if there were a prior
step in which, for the policies subject to captive reinsurance,
Travelers made payments to Acme and then received that money
back—strikes us as plausible. Travelers’ experts, whom the
District Court found credible, testified that what Travelers did
was consistent with industry practice. Given the very limited
nature of the review authorized by the follow-the-fortunes
doctrine, that is sufficient, even though there was contrary
testimony by INA’s experts.
In sum, we agree with the basic direction of the District
Court’s analysis, if not all of its details. The decision to bypass
the post-April 1982 AL policies was reasonable in light of both
the net nature of the deal with Acme and the specific
characteristics of those policies. Accordingly, we cannot say
that the decision is evidence of bad-faith maximization on
Travelers’ part.
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ii.

The Allocation of the Chemical
Products Claims Settlement

INA’s second challenge focuses on Travelers’ handling
of the $20 million of the settlement dedicated to the chemical
products claims. INA makes two arguments here. One of those
arguments essentially reprises the one considered in the previous
section, only this time directed toward Travelers’ decision to
bypass the XS layer of coverage in allocating the settlement
dollars dedicated to the chemical products claims. The response
is basically the same—the XS policies, although they provided
coverage for products claims and attached at lower points than
the XN policies, were subject to near-total reinsurance from
Acme subsidiaries. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for
Travelers to view those policies as exhausted in virtue of the net
settlement and skip straight to the XN layer.
INA’s other challenge to the handling of the chemical
products claims is new, however. It points out that there is
nothing in the record to indicate that Travelers ever conducted
a detailed analysis of the chemical products claims being
brought against Acme before agreeing to allocate $20 million of
the settlement to them. Thus, INA argues, Travelers’ handling
of these claims could not have been professionally reasonable,
as it was not based on an analysis of either Acme’s possible
exposure under those claims or how those claims potentially
matched up with the specific coverage available. Instead,
Travelers began with a number—$20 million—and worked
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backward from there.
We agree with the District Court that, under the
circumstances, this approach was not unreasonable. Yessman
testified that his main focus was on settling the breast implant
claims for an amount Travelers could live with. Prior to the
acquisition of Aetna CS by Travelers, Aetna CS had offered
Acme a $300 million coverage-in-place deal just for the breast
implant claims, which Acme rejected.26 When Travelers took
over Aetna CS’s policies, it set up initial reserves of $100
million for the breast implant claims.27 Given that, we cannot
say that the decision to dedicate $20 million to the chemical
products claims, in order to resolve the breast implant claims for
only $80 million, was unreasonable, even if it were not
grounded in the kind of analysis of the chemical products claims
that one expects to see.

26

Because this was a coverage-in-place offer, the $300
million figure represents the most Aetna CS could have paid, not
what it necessarily would have paid. Had Acme accepted the
offer and then proceeded to incur less than that in liability on the
breast implant claims, Aetna CS would not have had to pay out
the full $300 million.
27

Because these reserves were net of any reinsurance
recovery that would have been available to Travelers, the $100
million reserve corresponded to an even larger potential
settlement with Acme.
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iii.

The Indemnity-Only Allocation

Travelers allocated the $80 million dedicated to the
breast implant claims exclusively as indemnity. It did this
despite the fact that, at the time of the settlement, Acme had
spent substantial sums defending itself from those claims ($112
million), but had not yet incurred any liability on them. INA
asserts that this is unambiguous evidence of bad-faith
maximization on Travelers’ part, since allocating the settlement
exclusively as indemnity increased Travelers’ ability to get out
of the AL layer of coverage and into the XN layer. We,
however, are not convinced that the District Court erred in
holding to the contrary.
We note initially that, while Acme had yet to incur any
liability on the breast implant claims when the settlement was
reached, that does not mean that the only reasonable option was
to allocate that portion of the settlement exclusively as defense
costs. Travelers’ settlement with Acme released all of Acme’s
past and future claims under the policies. It was thus not
unreasonable for Travelers to view the settlement as covering
Acme’s yet-to-materialize liability. This is significant because
the only scenario in which paying defense costs would have
prevented Travelers from getting out of the AL layer at all—at
least on a single-occurrence allocation—was one in which it
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paid out nothing, or very little, in indemnity.28
Still, the decision to allocate this portion of the settlement
entirely as indemnity, as opposed to dedicating a portion to
Acme’s liability and a portion to Acme’s defense costs, likely
allowed Travelers to allocate more to the XN layer of coverage
than it otherwise could have, as defense costs would not have
counted toward the limits of the pre-April 1982 AL policies.
Moreover, that decision appears to have been largely unilateral
on Travelers’ part, as there is no record of Acme and Travelers
ever agreeing to a framework for handling the defense costs
versus indemnity issue, nor was that issue addressed in the final
settlement agreement.
Yet we are not inclined to depart from the District
Court’s finding that the decision to allocate the $80 million
exclusively as indemnity was sufficiently grounded in Travelers’
prior interactions with Acme that it cannot be characterized as

28

This is so for two reasons. First, Travelers could only
claim captive reinsurance on its defense costs payments to the
extent that it also paid out in indemnity. Thus, if it only covered
defense costs, its exposure under the AL policies would have
been significantly greater. Second, for the April 1976 through
April 1982 AL policies, defense costs did not count toward the
policy limits, which means that Travelers would not have
exhausted those policies had it not also paid up to their peroccurrence limits in indemnity.
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solely an attempt to maximize Travelers’ reinsurance recovery.
Yessman and Stonehill-Clafin both testified that, during their
early negotiations with Acme, Travelers made a coverage-inplace offer that included $15 million for past defense costs, and
$26 million for future defense costs and liability, only to be told
that the $15 million for past defense costs was “within
ballpark,” but the $26 million figure was “too low.” (Trial Tr.
vol. 1, 438, Jan. 12, 2005.) From that, Yessman reportedly
concluded that recouping past defense costs was not that
important to Acme, a position that both Yessman and one of
Travelers’ experts, Jerold Oshinsky, testified was consistent
with their experience with large policyholders, who tend to be
more interested in achieving coverage certainty going forward
than in recovering past losses. In addition, Travelers knew that
Acme would be getting defense coverage from another carrier,
the Fireman’s Fund, and, as one of INA’s own experts noted, it
is typical for a policyholder in Acme’s position to choose one
insurer among several to cover defense costs.
Given this context, we cannot say that the District Court’s
conclusion that “[t]he sum for the breast implant claims was
reasonably and in a businesslike manner paid as indemnity and
not as defense costs” was clearly erroneous. (J.A. at 44.)
iv.

The Wigmore Memo

INA contends that each of the specific allocation
decisions it cites as questionable must be read against the
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backdrop of the Wigmore Memo, which it characterizes as
direct evidence that Travelers allocated the settlement with an
eye toward maximizing its reinsurance recovery. Travelers
conceded at trial that it is a breach of the duty of good faith for
an insurer to take reinsurance implications into account in
making coverage decisions.
The District Court concluded that the Wigmore Memo
was not evidence that Travelers had generally acted in bad faith.
It did so on two grounds. First, the Court essentially accepted
Yessman’s testimony that the Memo’s purpose was to provide
him with a general estimate of Travelers’ potential net exposure
on the breast implant claims, which Travelers wanted in relation
to an indemnity agreement it had entered into with Aetna U.S.
Healthcare when it acquired Aetna CS,29 and that he did not use
the Memo to aid him in his negotiations with Acme. Second,
the Court accepted the testimony of Stonehill-Clafin, Miley and
Kingston (who, according to Travelers, were the ones
responsible for the details of the settlement agreement and the
post-settlement allocation), all of whom testified that they never
saw, or heard of, the Wigmore Memo prior to the subsequent
litigation, and that, as a general matter, they were walled off

29

According to Yessman’s testimony, Travelers was
concerned enough about the breast implant claims that it did not
agree to acquire Aetna CS until Aetna U.S. Healthcare agreed to
indemnify Travelers for some portion of its net loss covering
those claims (i.e., its loss after reinsurance recovery).
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completely from any information relevant to Travelers’
reinsurance recovery prospects.
In its brief, INA cites various reasons why we should not
find Yessman credible on this subject, despite the District
Court’s having found otherwise. It is unnecessary to detail those
reasons here. That is because, even were we to agree that
Yessman’s testimony was not credible—and also agree that
Yessman’s exposure to the Wigmore Memo contaminated the
other Travelers’ employees who worked on the settlement and
allocation, and whose credibility INA does not contest—that
would not change the result.
The Wigmore Memo’s two main points of emphasis are:
(1) that, if the breast implant claims were characterized as
arising out of multiple occurrences, the coverage was likely to
stay in the AL layer; and (2) that, because Acme’s subsidiaries
were not obligated to provide reinsurance so long as only
defense costs are covered, there was the possibility that Acme
would continue to litigate each of the claims without settling.
But neither of those points is particularly pertinent to what INA
is challenging here. First, as noted above, Travelers had
sufficient reasons, apart from concerns about reinsurance
recovery, to want to avoid a multiple-occurrence scenario, since
such a scenario would have greatly increased its exposure under
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the AL policies. 30 Thus, the Wigmore Memo is not itself
sufficient to show that Travelers insisted on a single-occurrence
characterization of the breast implant claims for reasons related
to reinsurance recovery (and, at any rate, INA does not raise the
number of occurrences issue on appeal). Second, the specific
point the Memo raised about defense costs was that, until
Travelers covered any losses stemming from liability, it could
not access the captive reinsurance. The Memo said nothing
about what is at issue here—namely, the effect of defense
coverage on Travelers’ ability to recover from its outside
reinsurers.
In sum, we do not discern clear error regarding the
District Court’s finding that “[t]he Wigmore Memo was not
used as a ‘roadmap’ by Travelers to negotiate [the] settlement
with Acme, or to allocate the settlement dollars to the insurance
policies.” (J.A. at 57.)
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This was true only for a coverage-in-place agreement
rather than an all-cash deal like the one ultimately reached. (On
an all-cash deal, the characterization of the claims for which
Acme was seeking coverage did not affect Travelers’ liability to
Acme.) However, at the time the Wigmore Memo was written,
Travelers was pursuing a coverage-in-place deal.
43

v.

The Sword/Shield Doctrine

Finally, INA argues that, even if it is not entitled to a
reversal of the District Court’s Phase I order, that order should
still be vacated, as (according to INA) the District Court based
its ruling on evidence that should have been excluded. More
specifically, INA contends that it was improper for the District
Court to draw inferences in Travelers’ favor based on its
consultations with outside and in-house counsel. INA’s
argument is that, because Travelers invoked the attorney-client
and work-product privileges to shield the substance of those
consultations, it should not have been allowed to defend its
conduct with reference to those consultations. See United States
v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and
a sword. . . . Thus, the privilege may implicitly be waived when
[the party claiming the privilege] asserts a claim that in fairness
requires examination of protected communications.” (internal
citations omitted)).
INA is correct that the District Court drew inferences in
Travelers’ favor based on the bare fact that, in connection with
the Acme settlement, it received advice from attorneys
experienced with insurance-coverage disputes. In particular, it
found Travelers’ receipt of such advice to be evidence that it
generally handled the settlement in a “reasonable” and
“businesslike” manner. (J.A. at 61.) But we do not agree that
the District Court’s Phase I ruling depended on those inferences.
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The Court’s conclusion that INA failed to show bad faith on
Travelers’ part was sufficiently supported by its findings that:
(1) the specific allocation decisions challenged by INA could be
accounted for without reference to intentional maximization;
and (2) the Travelers employees most responsible for the details
of the post-settlement allocation were screened off from the
reinsurance implications of their decisions. Accordingly, it is
unnecessary for us to determine whether a party that refers
generally to having received advice from counsel in order to
establish a pattern of businesslike conduct waives any associated
privileges. Even were the District Court’s consideration of the
disputed testimony error, it was harmless. See Hirst v. Inverness
Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Discretionary
evidentiary rulings will give rise to reversible error only where
a substantial right of the party is affected.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
*

*

*

*

*

In sum, we agree with the District Court that “there is . . .
enough evidence . . . to raise . . . suspicions” that Travelers
engineered its post-settlement allocation to maximize its
reinsurance recovery. (J.A. at 57.) That is why the District
Court was correct to deny summary judgment to Travelers,
despite the very deferential nature of the scrutiny authorized by
the follow-the-fortunes doctrine. However, reviewing the
District Court’s findings with the deference we must, we also
agree that INA did not meet its burden at trial of showing that
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the allocation decisions it was challenging were driven primarily
by reinsurance considerations. Accordingly, we affirm the
Phase I order in Travelers’ favor.
B.

The Phase II Ruling

The Phase II trial addressed one particular aspect of
Travelers’ allocation of the settlement—its decision, in
allocating the breast implant claims settlement, to treat the peroccurrence limits of the two three-year XN policies reinsured by
INA as applying separately to each policy year. INA argued that
it was not bound by Travelers’ decision to allocate that much of
the breast implant claims settlement to those two policies. That
was because (according to INA) that allocation enlarged the
limits of those policies beyond what INA agreed to reinsure.
The District Court agreed, ruling in INA’s favor. We affirm.
1.

The Policy Language

It is well settled that “a reinsurer cannot be held liable for
a kind of loss that it did not agree to cover.” CIGNA, 52 F.3d at
1206–07. “This distinction between reinsured and unreinsured
risk is particularly important in facultative reinsurance where the
reinsurer accepts only specific risks.” Id. at 1207. At the same
time, however, the “‘follow the fortunes’ doctrine creates an
exception to the general rule that contract interpretation is
subject to de novo review.” Id. at 1206. Thus, to prevail in its
challenge, INA had to show more than that, of the different
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reasonable interpretations of the relevant policy language, its is
the most persuasive. Rather, INA was required to show that,
under Michigan law (which both parties agree controls
interpretation of the XN policies), the “underlying policy
language . . . unambiguously provides that” the per-occurrence
limits are not subject to the treatment Travelers gave them (i.e.,
as applying separately to each policy year). Id. at 1207 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under Michigan law, an insurance policy is viewed
“much the same as any other contract.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
v. Churchman, 489 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Mich. 1992). That is, an
insurance policy is treated as “an agreement between the parties
in which a court will determine what the agreement was and
effectuate the intent of the parties.” Id. Where “the terms of the
contract are clear,” those terms must be enforced “as written.”
Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 595 N.W.2d 832, 837
(Mich. 1999). In interpreting such a contract, a court may not
“create ambiguity where none exists.” Auto-Owners, 489
N.W.2d at 434.
The two XN policies at issue here—01 XN 247 and 01
XN 752—are three-year policies. The language of the two
policies is identical, except that the limit provided for the former
is $4.5 million, while for the latter it is $8 million.31 Policy 01
31

As noted above, each facultative certificate issued by INA
contained a “follow-the-forms” clause. The general rule is that
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XN 752 reads in pertinent part as follows:
LIMITS OF LIABILITY:
53.33% ($8,000,000. MAXIMUM)
QUOTA SHARE OF $15,000,000.

[w]here a following form clause is
found in the reinsurance contract,
concurrency between the policy of
reinsurance and the reinsured
policy is presumed, such that a
policy of reinsurance will be
construed as offering the same
terms, conditions and scope of
coverage as exist in the reinsured
policy, i.e., in the absence of
explicit language in the policy of
reinsurance to the contrary.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328,
1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). As the District Court observed, there is
nothing in the certificates issued by INA that clearly restricts
INA’s reinsurance coverage beyond the limits stated in the
underlying policies. Thus, the question of whether INA is
bound by Travelers’ decision to annualize the per-occurrence
limits of three-year policies hinges entirely on whether that
decision was a reasonable interpretation of how the underlying
policies’ per-occurrence limits operated.
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EACH OCCURRENCE
53% ($8,000,000. MAXIMUM)
QUOTE SHARE OF $15,000,000.
ANNUAL AGGREGATE
As this makes clear, the policy is subject to two separate
limits—an aggregate limit and a per-occurrence limit. Travelers
concedes that the aggregate limit applied only to products
claims. Thus, that limit is not at issue here because the breast
implant claims were treated as non-product claims. But the
aggregate limit is modified by the word “annual,” while the
“each occurrence” limit is not. As the District Court noted, that
is a strong indication that the aggregate limit was meant to
operate annually, while the per-occurrence limit was not. This
conclusion is further bolstered by the language of the
“Indemnity Agreement” portion of the XN policies, which
provides in pertinent part that “[Travelers] will indemnify the
INSURED against EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of an
accident or occurrence during the policy period.” The clear
implication, again, is that the term “accident or occurrence” is
linked with the entire policy period—in this case, three
years—rather than being linked separately to each policy year.
The XN policies do not contain a definition of the term
“occurrence.” However, each XN policy incorporates the terms
and conditions of its underlying controlling policy (except with
respect to certain terms not at issue here). These policies were
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issued by the Home Insurance Company, and define an
“occurrence” as follows:
The term occurrence wherever used
herein shall mean an accident, or a
happening, or event, or a
continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions which unexpectedly and
unintentionally results in personal
injury, property damage or
advertising liability during the
policy period. All such exposure to
substantially the same general
conditions existing at or emanating
from one premise’s location shall
be deemed one occurrence.
This definition clearly contemplates “continuous” occurrences
that are capable of spanning multiple years (e.g., environmental
contamination). Such a definition is inconsistent with treating
an occurrence as a separate liability trigger for each policy year.
In sum, there is nothing in the relevant policy language
to suggest any ambiguity with respect to whether the policies’
per-occurrence limits are intended to apply separately to each
policy year. On the contrary, the language indicates that the peroccurrence limits—unlike the aggregate limits—are meant to
cover the entire policy period. This was the position advanced
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by INA’s expert, who testified (credibly, according to the
District Court) that he had never heard of a company
interpreting three-year policies like the ones at issue here in the
manner Travelers did. Thus, the District Court’s conclusion that
“under Michigan law the three-year XN policies clearly and
unambiguously have a single per-occurrence limit for the entire
policy period” is well founded. (J.A. at 96.)
2.

Travelers’ Argument

On appeal, Travelers does not appear to challenge the
details of the District Court’s interpretation of the two XN
policies (by, for instance, pointing to sources of ambiguity in the
policy language overlooked by the Court). Rather, Travelers
argues that the kind of analysis performed by the District
Court—one that involved “applying general rules of contract
construction to in effect predict what a Michigan court would do
if presented with the issue”—is insufficient to support a
judgment against it. (Travelers’ Br. at 32.) According to
Travelers, its right to bind INA to its interpretation of the
relevant per-occurrence limits follows from the fact that “[w]hen
Travelers made the annualization decision, there was no
Michigan law on the insurance annualization issue, and there
was a body of out-of-state law that had reached diametrically
different conclusions as to whether a multi-year insurance
contract with a per-occurrence limit should be interpreted as
having an annual per-occurrence limit.” Id. at 34. That,
Travelers argues, was enough to preclude INA from
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establishing—as it must, under the follow-the-fortunes
doctrine—that Travelers’ approach was not even arguably
authorized by the underlying policies.32
We are not convinced. Travelers bases its contention on
our decision in CIGNA. There, we addressed a reinsurer’s
argument that the policy it reinsured (which was governed by
Ohio law) could not reasonably be interpreted as authorizing

32

Indeed, Travelers argues that, once the District Court
concluded at the summary judgment stage both that there was no
Michigan law directly on point, and that there were nonMichigan decisions supporting annualization, it should have
immediately entered judgment in Travelers’ favor. See
Travelers’ Br. at 24. Because (as explained below) we reject the
premise that this was enough to entitle Travelers to judgment as
a matter of law, we need not determine whether this is one of
those rare instances in which a court of appeals should review
a denial of a summary judgment motion after a trial on the
merits. See Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714,
718 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that denials of summary
judgment are generally unreviewable after a trial on the merits
because “[o]nce the trial has taken place, [the] focus is on the
evidence actually admitted and not on the earlier summary
judgment record”); Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers’ Trust Funds
for S. Cal., 382 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (making an
exception to that rule when the earlier denial of summary
judgment was predicated on “an error of law that, if not made,
would have required the [D]istrict [C]ourt to grant the motion”).
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coverage of defense costs. CIGNA, 52 F.3d at 1207. We noted
that, under the follow-the-fortunes doctrine, the reinsurer bore
the “burden to prove that Ohio law would not support” an
interpretation that made the insurer liable for defense costs. Id.
at 1209–10. In concluding that the reinsurer had not met that
burden, we observed that it “ha[d] neither relied on nor cited to
any Ohio case directly on point. Nor have we found any.” Id.
at 1210. Travelers asserts that this language indicates that the
absence of any “on-point” Michigan decision at the time it
performed the allocation somehow fully resolves the issue in its
favor.
Once that language is put in its proper context, however,
we believe that it does not support the position Travelers
advocates here. Prior to the passage quoted above about the
absence of any pertinent Ohio case, the CIGNA Court had
already determined that the underlying insurance policy was
ambiguous on the question of whether defense costs were
covered. Id. at 1208–09. The specific point being made was
that, in the face of ambiguity in the underlying insurance
contract, a reinsurer cannot prevail simply by citing favorable
decisions from non-controlling jurisdictions, but must instead
rely on decisions from the state whose law governs the dispute.
See id. at 1210. In other words, the analysis endorsed in CIGNA
is that, where the policy language is ambiguous with respect to
the issue in dispute, a reinsurer can only meet its burden under
the follow-the-fortunes doctrine by pointing to a controlling
decision definitively resolving the ambiguity in its favor. But
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that is quite different than the rule Travelers urges us to adopt
here—namely, that the absence of an on-point decision from the
relevant jurisdiction by some alchemy renders the underlying
policy language ambiguous. Because Travelers has not
provided any reason for us to doubt the District Court’s
conclusion that the policy language unambiguously excludes
annualizing the per-occurrence policy limits, the absence of any
on-point Michigan decision is of no aid to Travelers.
Nor are we persuaded by Travelers’ citation to
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance America
Corp., 413 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2005), and American Employers’
Insurance Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 413 F.3d
129 (1st Cir. 2005). Both those cases, like this one, involved a
reinsurer’s claim that it was not obligated to follow its
reinsured’s decision to annualize the per-occurrence of its multiyear policies. Commercial Union, 413 F.3d at 122; Am.
Employers’, 413 F.3d at 134. In each, the Court vacated the
District Court’s prior decision in favor of the reinsurer.
Commercial Union, 413 F.3d at 129; Am. Employers’, 413 F.3d
at 139. Travelers contends that these decisions indicate that the
approach it took to the per-occurrence limits is sufficiently
within the zone of reasonableness to be binding under the
follow-the-fortunes standard.
Neither of those cases applies, however. In both, the
insurer was able to produce what Travelers has been unable to
provide here—some reasonable basis for its annualization
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decision beyond simply the claim that, at the time, such a
decision was not ruled out by the applicable body of law.33 In
Commercial Union, while the excess policies provided by
Commercial Union contained a definition of an “occurrence . . .
hostile to annualization,” those policies also included “followthe-form provisions” incorporating the underlying primary
policies, policies that did explicitly provide that their peroccurrence limits applied on an annual basis. 413 F.3d at 126.
Thus, there were grounds for Commercial Union to conclude,
prior to billing its reinsurer, that it might be exposed to its
insured based on annualization, a possibility that had been
explicitly raised by “Commercial Union’s outside coverage
counsel.” Id. In American Employers’, the insurer’s internal
assessments of its potential liability assumed annualization. 413
F.3d at 136–37. In addition, there were reasons for American
Employers to suspect that any resulting coverage dispute might
be governed by New Jersey law, “which is arguably pro-

33

In his Phase II testimony, Miley explained the decision to
treat the per-occurrence limits as applying separately to each
policy year by saying that “there is a dispute in the insurance
coverage world about whether or not for a single occurrence a
multi-year policy would pay an occurrence limit for each year of
that policy, or one overall occurrence limit,” that the decision
“seemed . . . reasonable,” and that it was one to which he “just
naturally gravitated towards . . . because it really had not been
a huge dispute in this case.” (Trial Tr. vol. 4, 1826, 1914, Feb.
21, 2006.)
55

annualization.” Id. at 137. Again, this provided a basis, prior to
its billing of its reinsurer, for American Employers to measure
its potential liability based on annualization.
There is nothing like that here. Travelers attempts to
create something analogous by claiming that, before it entered
the picture, Aetna CS had negotiated with Acme based on
annualization assumptions. Travelers’ evidence for this is a
“Term Sheet” that Aetna CS provided to Acme indicating that
the total non-products coverage available under the XN policies
for each occurrence was $226.5 million (the figure reached
through annualization), not $178.5 million (the figure reached
without annualization). But, as noted above, negotiations with
Acme started over from scratch after Travelers acquired Aetna
CS. Indeed, Travelers concedes that the issue of annualization
never came up between Travelers and Acme either prior to, or
after, the parties reached a tentative deal in July 1998.34
Moreover, Acme would not have had any reason to insist that
Travelers annualize the per-occurrence limits of the XN policies
because, under the settlement they reached, Travelers was only
providing $80 million in coverage for the breast implant claims,

34

Yessman testified that the reason the issue never came up,
at least prior to the July 1998 agreement, was that he
deliberately avoided raising it, as it was only relevant if the
breast implant claims were treated as non-products claims and
Travelers’ official position was that those claims were products
claims.
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which meant that there was more than enough coverage
available even without annualizing the limits. Thus, Travelers’
attempt to explain why it annualized the per-occurrence limits
of the three-year XN policies with reference to its interactions
with Acme is unconvincing.
In sum, Travelers has pointed to nothing in the policy
language, its prior assessments of its potential liability, or its
interactions with Acme to indicate that, when it performed its
allocation, it was reasonable to expect that, had the coverage
dispute been litigated, Acme could have successfully pressed the
annualization issue against it, or even that it would have had any
reason to do so. As such, we affirm the District Court’s Phase
II ruling that INA is not bound by Travelers’ decision to
annualize the per-occurrence limits of the policies INA
reinsured.
C.

The Rate of Prejudgment Interest

The combined effect of the District Court’s Phase I and
Phase II rulings was to leave Travelers entitled to $8,226,817 in
damages from INA. The Court then turned to the issue of
prejudgment interest, specifically whether such interest was to
be calculated according to the New York rate of 9%, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5004, or the Pennsylvania rate of 6%, 41 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 202. The Court concluded that—even though the parties
agreed New York law governed the reinsurance certificates that
formed the basis of INA’s liability to Travelers—Pennsylvania
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law governed the calculation of prejudgment interest on the
damages awarded to Travelers. That is because, according to
the District Court, the law governing the calculation of
prejudgment interest in Pennsylvania contract actions is
procedural, rather than substantive, for choice-of-law purposes.
We disagree with this characterization.
The District Court based its conclusion on Yohannon v.
Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1991), a case that
concerned Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238, which
governs “delay damages” 35 in actions for “bodily injury, death[,]
or property damage.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(1). More
specifically, in Yohannon we addressed whether a federal court
sitting in diversity in Pennsylvania must apply Rule 238 to tort
damages even where (as here) the parties have stipulated that the
law of another state governs their dispute. Yohannon, 924 F.2d
at 1264. In answering yes to this question, we stressed that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Rule 238
falls within the Court’s authority “to make rules of procedure
governing the administration of Pennsylvania’s court system.”
Id. at 1265–66. From that, we predicted that the Court would
also characterize Rule 238 as procedural for choice-of-law
purposes. Id. at 1267. We thus held that a district court

35

Although Rule 238 uses the term “delay damages,” not
prejudgment interest, the terms are interchangeable under
Pennsylvania law. See Daset Mining Corp. v. Indus. Fuels
Corp., 473 A.2d 584, 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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exercising diversity jurisdiction in Pennsylvania must apply
Rule 238 to the calculation of prejudgment interest in tort cases,
since a district court is bound by the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which it sits. Id. at 1266–67 (citing Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)).
Travelers challenges the application of Yohannon to our
case on two grounds. First, it argues that it was unnecessary for
the District Court to perform any choice-of-law analysis at all,
as the parties’ agreement that New York law applies to the
reinsurance contracts ought to control. This arguments rests on
a misunderstanding of choice-of-law principles. Travelers is
correct that, with respect to the substantive law that governs
their dispute, “the first question to be answered [under both
Pennsylvania law and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws] is
whether the parties explicitly or implicitly have chosen the
relevant law.” Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A. v. Clover, 195
F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 1999). However, “[i]n conflicts cases
involving procedural matters, Pennsylvania will apply its own
procedural laws when it is serving as the forum state.”
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1998).
Thus, if—as the District Court held—the calculation of
prejudgment interest in contract actions falls under
Pennsylvania’s procedural law, that fully resolves the choice-oflaw question, regardless of the parties’ stipulations.
Travelers’ second argument is that the District Court
erred in extending Yohannon’s holding from Rule 238 to the
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calculation of prejudgment interest in contract actions. To
address this challenge, we must decide whether our prior
prediction that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
consider Rule 238 procedural for choice-of-law purposes in tort
actions requires us to predict that it would also characterize the
rules governing the calculation of prejudgment interest in
contract actions as procedural in nature.
The key to our conclusion in Yohannon was the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s “steadfast . . . position” that Rule
238 is procedural and not substantive. 924 F.2d at 1266. The
analysis in Yohannon drew primarily on Laudenberger v. Port
Authority of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981), where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—over “strong dissents and
concurrences arguing that Rule 238” is unconstitutional,
Yohannon, 924 F.2d at 1266—concluded that Rule 238 falls
within its authority to “‘prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts . . . if such rules
. . . neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant[.]’” 36 436 A.2d at 149 (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, §
10(c)) (first alteration in original). Because the Supreme Court
“ha[d] never deviated” from this position, we concluded that it

36

A new version of Rule 238 was adopted in 1988, after the
Laudenberger decision. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has made clear that the analysis provided in Laudenberger
applies to the current version of the Rule. See Costa v.
Lauderdale Beach Hotel, 626 A.2d 566, 568 (Pa. 1993).
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would “apply Rule 238 uniformly to a determination of prejudgment interest without regard to its usual rules on choice of
law.” Yohannon, 924 F.2d at 1266–67.
By contrast, prejudgment interest in contract actions is
called for by statute rather than by rule. See 41 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 202. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court had previously
concluded that Rule 238 delay damages are available for any
claim for “property damages,” regardless whether it is in
contract or tort. See Loeffler v. Moutaintop Area Joint Sanitary
Auth., 516 A.2d 848, 851–52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
However, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court recently
clarified the scope of Rule 238 and confirmed that it is limited
to tort actions. See Touloumes v. E.S.C. Inc., 899 A.2d 343, 349
(Pa. 2006) (“Rule 238 delay damages are not available in a
breach of contract action where the damages sought are
measurable by actual property damage.”) Thus, unlike the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s “steadfast” insistence that delay
damages under Rule 238 are procedural in nature in tort actions,
there is no comparable body of precedent that suggests
Pennsylvania courts in contract cases would characterize the
pre-existing “legal right to pre-judgment interest in contract
actions” as procedural. Id.
We thus predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would conclude that prejudgment interest in contract actions is
a substantive rather than a procedural matter, even were it to
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analyze the issue under the framework laid out in Laudenberger.
In concluding that Rule 238 is procedural, the Laudenberger
Court reasoned as follows:
Rule 238 awards damages for delay
only in cases where the defendant
made no settlement offer prior to
trial or where the defendant made
an offer of settlement which was
25% less than the amount of the
jury verdict. . . . In those instances
where the settlement offer is not
accepted and the jury verdict does
not exceed the offer by 25%, the
interest is only computed up to the
date of the settlement offer. By
tolling the running of interest, this
p ro v is io n d e m o n s tra te s th e
prominent goal of fostering early
settlements. Undeniably, this rule
serves to compensate the plaintiff
for the inability to utilize funds
rightfully due him, but the basic
aim of the rule is to alleviate delay
in the disposition of cases, thereby
lessening congestion in the courts.
436 A.2d at 151 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court held
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that, while Rule 238 has the substantive effect of creating a right
to compensation, its main purpose is procedural (i.e., to govern
litigation behavior), as evidenced by the fact that its
“format . . . is responsive to [the] fundamental goal of prompting
meaningful negotiations in major cases so as to unclutter the
courts.” 37 Id.
The key to Laudenberger’s holding, then, is that Rule
238 takes specific measures, beyond simply making awards of
prejudgment interest available, to provide litigants with
incentives to settle cases. In other words, the position advanced
in Laudenberger—and extended to the choice-of-law context in
Yohannon—is that Rule 238 is procedural, despite having some
substantive elements, because its provisions are specially
structured to relieve the burden on the courts by encouraging
early settlements.
Pennsylvania’s rules governing prejudgment interest in
contract actions, on the other hand, are not similarly structured

37

The only relevant change in Rule 238 post-Laudenberger
is that, under the revised Rule, a defendant cannot be charged
prejudgment interest for any period of delay attributable to the
plaintiff. See Schrock v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., Daroff Div.,
589 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 1991) (explaining this change). That
is consistent with Laudenberger’s analysis of the Rule’s
purpose—that it provides prejudgment interest to encourage
defendants to make realistic settlement offers promptly.
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to promote early settlement (even though they may have that
effect). The statute that sets the rate of prejudgment interest in
contract actions—41 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 202—does not provide
any criterion to govern its application, but simply defines the
“legal rate of interest” as “six per cent per annum.” Under
Pennsylvania law, eligibility for prejudgment interest in contract
actions is governed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 354. See Fernandez v. Levin, 548 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 1988).
Section 354 provides in pertinent part that “[i]f the breach
consists of a failure to pay a definite sum in money[,] . . .
interest is recoverable from the time for performance on the
amount due less all deductions to which the party in breach is
entitled.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354(1). Thus,
under Pennsylvania law, where a plaintiff prevails in a contract
action pertaining to “a definite sum,” prejudgment interest is
available as a matter of right starting from when the amount due
under the contract was initially withheld. See Fernandez, 548
A.2d at 1193; Palmgreen v. Palmer’s Garage, Inc., 117 A.2d
721, 722 (Pa. 1955). And so, unlike in the case of tort damages,
entitlement to prejudgment interest on contract damages does
not depend on whether the defendant made a settlement offer,
and, if so, how that offer compares to the amount ultimately
awarded.
This further suggests that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would not consider Pennsylvania’s rules governing
prejudgment interest in contract actions procedural, at least not
if it were to analyze the issue under the framework laid out in
64

Laudenberger. We do not doubt that, by providing for an award
of prejudgment interest as a matter of right in contract actions,
Pennsylvania law encourages prompt settlement of contract
disputes (at least relative to a legal regime in which such awards
were not available). But there is nothing to indicate that doing
so is the main goal of providing those awards. On the contrary,
Pennsylvania courts have typically explained why prejudgment
interest is available as a matter of right in contract actions with
reference to a specifically compensatory purpose—to
compensate for “the fact that the breaching party has deprived
the injured party of using interest accrued on money which was
rightfully due and owing to the injured party.” Widmer Eng’g,
Inc. v. Dufalla, 837 A.2d 459, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); see
also Touloumes, 899 A.2d at 348–49 (emphasizing that the
compensatory purpose of Rule 238—“secur[ing] monies for the
delay of relief”—“was already recognized by the legal right to
pre-judgment interest in contract actions”); Palmgreen, 117
A.2d at 722 (“In all cases of contract[,] interest is allowable at
the legal rate from the time payment is withheld after it has
become the duty of the debtor to make such payment; allowance
of such interest does not depend upon discretion but is a legal
right.”).
It is true that in Laudenberger the Court stated that Rule
238 also serves to compensate successful plaintiffs for the loss
of the use of money to which they were entitled. See 436 A.2d
at 151.
Subsequent decisions have repeated that
characterization. See, e.g., Willet v. Pa. Med. Catastrophe Loss
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Fund, 702 A.2d 850, 854 n.7 (Pa. 1997) (explaining that “the
purpose of [R]ule [238] is to both compensate the plaintiff for
the delay in receiving funds and to encourage the prompt
resolution of meritorious claims”); Schrock v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr, Daroff Div., 589 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 1991) (same).
But the theme of Laudenberger is that it is only because Rule
238 is structured to promote early settlement in the specific
context of tort actions that it can be fairly characterized as
procedural. Cf. Touloumes, 899 A.2d at 348 (noting that
Laudenberger had “emphasiz[ed] the application of Rule 238 to
tort litigation in explaining the reason[s] for [its] promulgation
of [the] Rule,” which “reflect[ed] the intention of the Court
regarding the limited nature of the Rule and its inapplicability to
breach of contract actions”).
In Schrock, one of the cases in which Rule 238’s
compensatory elements were emphasized, Justice McDermott
was moved to concur specifically in order to reiterate this
understanding of the relationship between Rule 238’s procedural
and substantive elements:
I write separately to re-emphasize
that the purpose of Rule 238 is to
alleviate delay in the disposition of
cases. The fact that successful
plaintiffs will recover interest on
“money properly belonging” to
them is an undeniable byproduct of
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the Rule, but not its purpose. . . .
Rule 238 is a procedural exercise of
the rule-making powers of this
Court, not an exercise of our
substantive judicial powers.
589 A.2d at 1107 (McDermott, J., concurring) (emphases in
original) (internal citations omitted). We believe that this best
captures the status of Rule 238 under Pennsylvania law—that it
is procedural despite, not because of, the fact that it compensates
successful parties for the loss of the use of their money. See
Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 151 (“Undeniably, this rule serves
to compensate the plaintiff for the inability to utilize funds
rightfully due him, but the basic aim of the rule is to alleviate
delay in the disposition of cases, thereby lessening congestion
in the courts.”).
As such, we conclude that the better interpretation of
Pennsylvania law on this issue is that, while Rule 238 serves a
procedural purpose (combating the backlog in the courts) in a
manner that incidentally affects the substantive right to be
compensated for the loss of the use of one’s money, the rules
that govern prejudgment interest in contract actions do the
reverse —they serve a compensatory purpose in a manner that
only incidentally affects the number of cases that go to trial.
Accordingly, the rationale provided in Yohannon for
characterizing Rule 238 as procedural for choice-of-law
purposes does not carry over to contract actions. We thus part
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from the District Court’s characterization of the Pennsylvania
law governing the calculation of prejudgment interest in contract
actions as procedural rather than substantive.
We believe on that basis that the District Court should
have calculated the prejudgment interest owed to Travelers
according to the New York rate. INA has conceded throughout
this litigation that the reinsurance contracts Travelers sued to
enforce are governed by the substantive law of New York. INA
has cited no reason why a Pennsylvania court, if asked to
determine which substantive law applies to the calculation of
prejudgment interest, would depart from the understanding of
the parties. Accordingly, we conclude that New York law
applies here to the calculation of prejudgment interest. See
Assicurazioni, 195 F.3d at 164–65 (explaining that, where the
parties have “implicitly . . . chosen” a particular law to govern
their contract dispute, that law controls under Pennsylvania’s
choice-of-law rules in the absence of a compelling reason to the
contrary). We therefore remand with instructions to modify
Travelers’ award of prejudgment interest by calculating it
according to the higher New York rate.
D.

The Accrual Date of the Post-Judgment Interest on
the Prejudgment Interest

The final issue we address concerns the date on which
post-judgment interest on the prejudgment interest began to
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run.38 Travelers contends that post-judgment interest on the
prejudgment interest began to accrue on August 14, 2006, when,
following its Phase II ruling, the District Court entered judgment
in favor of Travelers in the amount of $8,226,817 on its
underlying reinsurance coverage claim. The District Court held
that the relevant date was December 5, 2007, when, following
its resolution of the rate-of-prejudgment-interest issue, it entered
a judgment requiring INA to pay Travelers $3,240,676.51 in
prejudgment interest.39 We side with the District Court.
It is not hard to see the logic of Travelers’ position. The
August 14, 2006 order, by establishing Travelers’ entitlement to
an award of damages, also established its entitlement to
prejudgment interest on that award. Post-judgment interest is
typically understood as “compensation to ensure that a money
judgment will be worth the same when it is actually received as
it was when it was awarded.” Dunn v. HOVIC, 13 F.3d 58, 60
(3d Cir. 1993). Thus, it makes sense that post-judgment interest
on prejudgment interest would begin to run as soon as an order
establishing the right to prejudgment interest is entered. See

38

As explained below, this issue is not affected by the fact
that we are directing the District Court to revise its initial award
of prejudgment interest.
39

Technically, the judgment was issued by the District Court
on December 3, 2007. It was not entered by the Clerk of the
Court until December 5, 2007.
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Caffery v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that to allow a gap between when a party first became
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest and when postjudgment interest on that award began to run would be contrary
to “the compensatory goal of the postjudgment interest statute”).
Nonetheless, our decision in Eaves v. County of Cape
May, 239 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001), precludes us from following
that logic here. In Eaves, we addressed whether post-judgment
interest on attorneys’ fees “runs from the date that the District
Court rules initially that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney[s’]
fees, or alternatively, from the date that the District Court
actually quantifies the amount awarded.” Id. at 527–28. We
ultimately concluded that “post-judgment interest on an
attorney[s’] fee award runs from the date that the District Court
enters a judgment quantifying the amount of fees owed . . .[,]
rather than the date that the Court finds that the party is entitled
to recover fees, if those determinations are made separately.”
Id. at 542. Applying Eaves’ analysis to this case, the relevant
date was December 5, 2007, when Travelers’ award of
prejudgment interest was quantified.
Travelers urges us to distinguish this case from Eaves on
the ground that Eaves dealt with an award of attorneys’ fees and
we deal here with an award of prejudgment interest. We see no
basis for doing so. The conclusion in Eaves was driven by a
general reading of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), the
statute that provides for post-judgment interest, not anything
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particular to attorneys’ fees as a type of award. See Eaves, 239
F.3d at 538 (explaining that its result is based on the “plain
language” of § 1961(a), rather than a fact-sensitive application
of the policy considerations underlying the statute). Section
1961(a) provides in pertinent part that “[i]nterest shall be
allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a
district court,” and that “such interest shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment . . . .” § 1961(a). What we
held in Eaves was that (1) under § 1961(a), an award must be
granted pursuant to a “money judgment” to trigger postjudgment interest, and (2) to count as a “money judgment” a
judgment must include both “an identification of the parties for
and against whom judgment is being entered,” and “a definite
and certain designation of the amount . . . owed.” Eaves, 239
F.3d at 532–33 (quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res.,
733 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in original). As
such, Eaves requires us to read § 1961(a) as providing that, as
a general matter, post-judgment interest on a particular award
only starts running when a judgment quantifying that award has
been entered. See Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 372
F.3d 193, 217 (3d Cir. 2004) (interpreting Eaves to stand for this
general reading of § 1961(a)). Although there is much to
criticize in Eaves, its interpretation of § 1961(a) controls until
the Supreme Court, or our own Court en banc, says otherwise.
Accordingly, post-judgment interest on Travelers’ award
of prejudgment interest did not begin to run until the December
5, 2007 order was entered quantifying the amount in
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prejudgment interest owed to Travelers. That the District Court
incorrectly calculated the amount of prejudgment interest due
(by using the Pennsylvania, rather than the New York, rate) does
not change the date of accrual. See Dunn, 13 F.3d at 61–62
(explaining that, when a court of appeals merely modifies an
award, that does not change the date on which post-judgment
interest on that award began to run). We thus direct that the
post-judgment interest on the District Court’s revised calculation
of prejudgment interest continue to run from the date on which
the order quantifying the award was entered (December 5,
2007).
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the Phase I verdict, the
Phase II verdict, and the District Court’s order concerning the
accrual date of post-judgment interest on the prejudgment
interest. With respect to the Court’s award of prejudgment
interest to Travelers, we remand so that the award may be
recalculated according to the New York rate.
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